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*JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT [UTAH COURT OF APPEALS^ 
Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to its own 
rules and case authority as follows: 
Glad v Glad 567 P.2d 160 (UT 1977)] 
Gilroy v Lowe 626 P.2d 469 (UT 1981)1 
Rule 3 "Appeals as of Right; How Taken11 
Rule 4 "Appeals as of Right; When Taken" 
Rule 22 "Computation and Enlargement of Time" 
*Rule 35 "Petition for Re-Hearing" 
"...(a) Time For Filing; Answer; Oral Argument 
Not Permitted...A rehearing will not be granted in the 
absence of a petition for rehearing. A matter may not 
be reheard by the Court en banc. A petition for rehearing 
may be filed with the Clerk within~""l4 days after the entry 
of the decision of the Court of Appeals, unless the 
time is shortened or enlarged by order. The petition 
shall state with particularity the points of law or 
fact which the petitioner claims the Court has overlooked 
or misapprehended and shall contain such argument in 
support of the petition as the petitioner so desires. 
Counsel for the petitioner must certify that the 
petition is presented in good faith and not for delay. 
Oral argument in support of the petition will not be 
permitted. No answer to a petition for rehearing will 
- be received unless requested by the Court...." 
Rule 36 "Remittitur" 
U.R.C.P. Rule 6(a) [Time-Computation] 
This Petition For F.e-Hearing of Order of Dismissal is based 
upon misapprehension of the facts and the law, same having not 
been pointed out to the court b]/ the defendant/respondent, and 
said law being contrary to the Motion For Dismissal and directly 
on point. 
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STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Petition For Re-Hearing on Order of Dismissal of the court 
entered 3/31/88 based upon Rules of Utah Court of Appeals 4(a) and 
U.R.C.P. R.ule 58A(d) neither of which are determinative of the 
motion and counsel for defendant/respondent having not pointed out 
to the court that there is case law directly on the point and 
which is controlling including but not limited to authority as 
follows: 
Glad v Glad 567 P.2d 160 (UT 1977)1 
Gilroy v Lowe 626 P.2d 469 (UT 1981)1 j 
Rule 22 "Computation and Enlargement of Time" 
1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
Appeal was timely filed pursuant to statutory provisions and 
case law interpreting time for filing and computation of time. 
i 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Plaintiff/Appellant seeks a re-hearing on Order of Dismissal 
and that same be recinded based upon a misapprehension of the law 
i 
as set out by the Utah Supreme Court with regards to computation 
of time for filing of appeal. 
i 
( 
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[STATEMENT OF THE CASE! 
PETITION FOR RE-HEARING 
(Rule 35 [Petition For Re-Hearing]) 
(Rule 27(a) [Form of Petition]) 
COMES NOW, the above-named Plaintiff/Appellant by and through 
his Attorney of Record, Steven Lee Payton, and hereby petitions 
the court for re-hearing on dismissal order [untimely appeal] 
3/31/88 the court having overlooked or misapprehended points of 
law from the Supreme Court of Utah upon the specific issue herein 
and pursuant to said decisions plaintiff/appellants appeal is 
timely. [Glad v Glad 567 P.2d 160 (UT 1977)] 
[R. Ut. Ct. App. Rule 22 "Computation of Time"] 
Timeliness of Petition 
Furthermore said petition for re-hearing is filed pursuant to 
R. Ut. Ct. App, Rule 35 "Petition For Re-Hearing" within fourteen 
(14) days after entry of decision of the court March 31, 1988 
Order of Dismissal [Untimely Appeal]. 
Petition In Good Faith 
Counsel for plaintiff/appellant certifies that this petition 
is presented in good faith, not for delay, and is based upon case 
law set out herein. 
Defendant/Respondent Motion 
Defendant/Respondents motion for dismissal of appeal cited no 
authority and was not in proper form pursuant to requirements of 
the Utah Court of Appeals Rules, applicable as follows: 
F.ule 10 "Motion For Summary Disposition" 
Rule 23 "Motions-Contentfr^^ 
Rule 27 "Motions-Form11 
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Request For Oral Argument 
Oral argument is requested herein however allowable only in 
the discretion of the court pursuant to R. Ut. Ct. App. Rule 2 
Suspension of Rules'1 it being in the interest of justice herein 
and it appearing that the court has misapprehended the law. 
P.ules of Professional Responsibility
 { 
Further defendant/respondent failed to disclose adverse case 
authority contrary to the motion [Rules of Professional Conduct 
Rule 3.3 MCandor Toward The Tribunal [Effective January 1, 1988]. , 
Rule 3.3 ,yCandor Toward The Tribunal" 
ff
. . . (a) A LAWYER SHALL NOT KNOWINGLY: 
(3) Fail to disclose to the tribunal legal \ 
authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the 
lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the 
client and not disclosed by opposing counsel....11 
Comment: MISLEADING LEGAL ARGUMENT 
i 
"...Legal argument based on a knowingly false 
representation of law constitutes dishonesty toward a 
tribunal. A lawyer is not required to make a disinterested 
exposition of the law, but must recognize the existence of 
pertinent legal authorities" Furthermore, as stated in 
paragraph (a)(3), an advocate has a duty to disclose 1 
directly adverse authority in the controlling jurisdiction 
which has not been disclosed by the opposing party...." 
(Emphasis Added) 
i 
i 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Date 
01/26/88 (Tues.) 
[Addendum 1] 
01/26/88 (Tues.) 
[Addendum 2,3] 
01/26/88 (Tues.) 
[Postmarked 1/27/88] 
[Addendum 5^  
02/26/88 (Fri.) 
[Addendum 3,4] 
02/26/88 (Fri.) 
[Addendum 8] 
03/08/88 (Tues.) 
[Addendum 1-4] 
03/31/88 (Thurs.) 
[Addendum 6,7] 
Description 
James S. Sawaya, Third District Court 
Judge signed n0rder Declining 
Jurisdiction" in a case that had 
previously been heard in Utah and 
pending since 1982 and in which the 
divorce was granted in the state of Utah 
and where parties resided. 
Order filed in Clerks Office 3rd D/C 
SLCo. 
Notice of decision was given to all 
parties by minute entry however 
plaintiff/appellants appeal is still 
timely herein. 
Plaintiff/Appellant herein filed an 
appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, 
copy attached. 
Bond on Appeal [Receipt #20032] 
Counsel for defendant/respondent filed a 
Motion For Dismissal of Appeal, copy of 
which is attached. 
Court entered an Order of Dismissal based 
upon the fact that the appeal was 
untimely under R. Utah Ct. App. 4A and 
U.R.C.P*. Rule 58A(d) . 
04/13/88 (Wed.) Plaintiff/appellant files a Petition For 
Re-Hearing for reason that the court 
ruling is contrary to the law of the 
Supreme Court regarding calculation of 
time. 
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LIST OF EXHIBITS 
ADDENDUM 
Description ## 
Defendant/Respondent "Motion For Dismissal of Appeal" 1-4 
[Untimely Appeal] 3/8/88 David S. Dolowitz, Esq. 
Order Declining Jurisdiction Civil #D-82-2587 2-3 
Judge, James S. Sawaya Filed 1/26/88 3rd D/C SLCo. 
Minute Entry Notice of Decision Postmarked 1/27/88 5 
Plaintiff/Appellant Notice of Appeal Civil #D-82-2587 3-4 
3rd D/C SLCo., Judge, James S. Sawaya Filed 2/26/88 
Utah Court of Appeals Order of Dismissal 3/31/88 6-7 
[Untimely appeal] Honorable Regnal W. Garff, For 
The Court 
Receipt #20032 Salt Lake County Clerk $300 Cost Bond 8 
Hofeling v Hofeling (Witowski) Civil #D-82-2587 
Glad v Glad 567 P.2d 160 (TJT 1977) 9-10 
Gilrov v Lowe 626 P.2d 469 (UT 1981) 11-13 
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. MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITY 
(Rule 23(3) "Motions" [Rules Utah Court of Appeals] 
[All motions shall be accompanied by a brief 
statement of points and authorities] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
APPEAL WAS TIMELY FILED PURSUANT TO STATTJTORY 
PROVISIONS AND CASE LAW INTERPRETING TIME FOR 
FILING AND COMPUTATION OF TIME. 
TIME FOR APPEAL 8 
COMPUTATION OF TIME 9 
CASE INTERPRETATIONS 10 
COMMENTARY 11-15 
CONCLUSION 15 
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POINT 
APPEAL WAS TIMELY FILED PURSUANT TO STATUTORY 
PROVISIONS AND CASE LAW INTERPRETING TIME FOR 
FILING AND COMPUTATION OF TIME. 
TIME FOR APPEAL 
Jurisdiction Court of Appeals 
U.C.A. 78-?a-3 TtCourt of Appeals Jurisdiction 
[Effective January 1, 1988T 
"...(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate 
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory 
appeals, over: < 
11(g)...[Alppeals from district court involving domestic 
relations cases including, but not limited to, divorce 
annulment, property division, child custody, support 
and visitation, adoption, and paternity....11 
Utah Court of Appeals Rules 
Rule 3(a) MAppeals as of Right; How Taken'1 
ff
...(a) Filing appeal from final orders and 
judgments. As defined and provided by law, an appeal \ 
may be taken from the final orders and judgments of a 
district court, juvenile court, or circuit court to the 
Court of Appeals by filing a notice of appeal with the 
clerk of the particular court from which the appeal is 
taken within the time allowed by Foile 4~ Failure of an 
appellant to take any step other than the timely filing i 
of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of 
the appeal, but is a ground only for such action as the 
Court of Appeals deems appropriate, which may include 
dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of 
dismissal, as well as the award of attorneys fees....11 
i 
Rule 4 MAppeals as of Right: When TakenM 
"...(a) Appeal From Final Judgment and Order. In a 
case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right 
from the district court, juvenile court, or circuit court 
to the Court of Appeals, the notice of appeal required by < 
Rule 3 shall be filed with"~the clerk of the court from 
which the appeal is taken within 30 days after the date 
of entry of the judgment or order appealed from...." 
(Emphasis AddecH 
4 
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COMPUTATION OF TIME 
R. Utah Ct. App. Rule 22 "Computation and Enlargement of TimeM 
"...In computing any period of time prescribed by 
these rules, by an order of the court, or by any applicable 
statute the day of the act, event, or default from which 
the designated period of time begins to run shall not 
be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a 
legal holiday, in which event the period extends until 
the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, a Sunday, 
or a legal holiday. When the period of time prescribed 
or allowed is less than seven days, intermediate 
Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall be excluded 
in the computation. As used in this rule, "legal 
holiday" includes days designated as holidays by the state 
and federal governments ...." (Emphasis Added) 
U.R.C.P. Rule 6 [Time] 
"...(a) Computation In computing any period of 
time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by the local 
rules of any district court, by order of court, or by 
any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or 
default from which the designated period of time begins 
to run shall not be included^ The last day of the period 
so computed shall be included unless it is a Saturday, 
a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event the period 
runs until the end of the next day which is not a Saturday, 
a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time 
prescribed or allowed is less than seven days intermediate 
Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded 
in the computation...." (Emphasis Added) 
U.C.A. 68-3-7 "Time How Computed" 
"...The time in which any act provided by law is to 
be done is computed by excluding the first day and including 
the last, unless the last is a holiday, and then it also ~" 
is excluded. . . . " (Emphasis AddecTj 
U.C.A. 78-27-19 "By Law Defined" 
"...Wherever in this Code the term "by law" is 
used with reference to any act or thing done or to be 
done, such term shall refer to all statutes in effect 
as well as the Rules of Civil Procedure or other court 
rules and any decision of the Supreme Court interpreting 
the same. . . .ff (Emphasis Added! 
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*CASE INTERPRETATIONS 
Glad v Glad 567 P.2d 160 (UT 1977) 
"...@pg 162...Defendant asserts that the appeal 
should be dismissed as not being timely and in support 
thereof points out the order appealed from was entered 
October 28, 1976, and that the notice of appeal was filed 
on November 29, 1976, more than one month after entry of 
said order. Rule 6(a) U.R.C.P. is dispositive of this 
point in providing for the computation of time that the 
day of the act, event, or default after which the 
designated period of time begins to run is not Included. 
Also, if the last day of the period falls on Sunday it~ 
is not included and such was the case here. Consequently 
the appeal was timely filed.../1 (Emphasis Added) "~ 
Gilroy v Lowe 626 P.2d 469 (UT 1981) 
fl
...@pg 471.. .The method of computing time periods 
relating to acts provided for by law is set out in 
Rule 6(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and §§6ff-3-7 and 
8, U.C.A. 1953, as amendecH When the time period is 
measured in months or years from a certain date, the day 
from which the time period is to run is excluded and the 
same calendar date of the final month or year is included 
See Albrecht v Uranium Services, Inc. Utah, 596 P. 2d 1025 
(1979). Furthermore even if the limitations period 
expired on October 21, 1979, that date was a Sunday and 
the time period extended, until the end of the next day 
See Nelson v Jorgenson, 66 Utah 360, 242 P 945 (1926). 
The execution sale on October 22, 1979 was timely, as 
was properly found by the trial court...." 
(Emphasis Added) 
-COPIES OF BOTH CASES ARE INCLUDED IN THEIR ENTIRETY 
IN ADDENDUM. Page 9^TS 
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COMMENTARY 
Tuesday, March 8, 1988 counsel for defendant/respondent filed 
with the Utah Court of Appeals a Motion For Dismissal of Appeal, 
grounds and basis for which were that the plaintiff/appellants 
appeal was not timely filed for reason that the Order appealed 
from was entered January 26, 1988 and the Notice of Appeal was 
filed February 26, 1988, it being the assertion of the 
defendant/respondent that that is 31 days after entry of the trial 
court Order from which appeal is taken. The motion further 
alleged that plaintiff/appellants appeal was contrary to R. Ut, 
Ct. App. Rule 4(a) which provides as follows: 
Rule 4 "Appeals as of Right: When TakenTt 
"...(a) Appeal From Final Judgment and Order. In a 
case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right 
from the district court, juvenile court, or circuit court 
to the Court of Appeals, the notice of appeal required by 
Rule 3 shall be filed with"""the clerk of the court from 
which the appeal is taken within '30 days after the date 
of entry of the judgment or order appealed from.,,," 
(Emphasis Added) 
Petition For Re-Hearing 
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Defendant/respondent cited no case authority and furthermore 
did not cite to the court its own rules nor case authority of the 
Utah Supreme Court contrary to defendant/respondents motion as 
follows: 
R. Ut. Ct. App. Rule 22(a) Computation of Time" 
"...(a) Computation of Time. In computing any 
period of time prescribed by these rules, by an order 
of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of 
the act, event, or default from which the designated 
period of time begins to run shall not be included. The 
last day of the period shall be included, unless it is < 
a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which 
event the period extends until the end of the next day 
that is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. 
When the period of time prescribed or allowed, is less 
than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and 
legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation. < 
As used in this rule, "legal holiday" includes days 
designated as holidays by the state and federal 
governments...." (Emphasis Added) 
R. Ut. Ct. App. Rule 3 "Appeals as of Right; How Taken" 
R. Ut. Ct. App. Rule 4 "Appeals as of Right; When Taken" 
Glad v Glad 567 P.2d 160 (UT 1977) < 
Gilroy v Lowe 616 P.2d 469 (UT 1981) 
Plaintiff/appellant had 30 days from the date the order was 
entered [Tuesday, January 26, 1988] in which to file an appeal. 
i 
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Based upon the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals and 
decisions of the Utah Supreme Court as set out herein Glad, supra, 
p.10 computation of time in this case must exclude Tuesday, 
January 26, 1988 that being the date that the order was entered as 
appearing from the face thereof [Addendum Exhibit 2-3] . Janua^ 
27, 1988 would then be the first day and the 30th day would be 
Friday, February 26, 1988. Calendar is set out herein for 
purposes of the court examining the dates. 
JANUARY 1988 
S M T W TH 
3 4 5 6 7 
10 11 12 13 14 
17 18 19 20 21 
24 25 26 27 28 
31 
FEBRUARY 1988 
M 
1 
8 
15 
22 
29 
T 
2 
9 
16 
23 
W 
3 
10 
17 
24 
TH 
4 
11 
18 
25 
F 
5 
12 
19 
26 
S 
6 
13 
20 
27 
Based upon the courts own rules for computing time as well as 
court decisions, excluding the first day and including the last 
pursuant to R. Ut. Ct. App. Rule 22 "Computation and Enlargement 
of Time" the plaintiff/appellants appeal was timely filed. 
F S 
1 2 
8 9 
15 16 
22 2.3 
29 30 
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This same issue was raised in the case of Glad v Glad 567 
P.2d 160 (UT 1977) and Gilroy v Lowe 616 P.2d 469 (UT 1981) and 
the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the provisions for computation 
of time as has the plaintiff/appellant herein that being that one 
excludes the first day on which order is filed with the clerk. 
Defendant/Respondent was under a duty to advise the Court of 
Appeals in the Motion To Dismiss of the cases interpreting 
computation of times since Glad v Glad, supra, specifically < 
involves a domestic relations case as is the case on appeal 
herein. Failure to so advise the court of this case and facts 
amounted to misleading the court. 1 
Defendant/Respondents computation of time purportedly 
representing that it is based upon R. Ut. Ct. App. Rule 4(a) would 
be correct as being 31 days only if one counts January 26, 1988, i 
the date that the order was entered in the clerks office. It is 
clear however that the Utah Supreme Court by case law as well as 
Utah Court of Appeals Rules [R. Ut. Ct. App. Rule 22 Computation ( 
of Time"] specify that the first day is excluded from the period 
of time therefore plaintiff/appellants appeal was timely. 
i 
i 
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Further authority contrary to the defendant/respondents 
assertion can be found as follows: 
Federal Court of Appeals Manual [Manual of Practice 
In The United States Court of Appeals] David G. Knibb 
West Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minnesota 1981 
,"...@pg 57 Chapter 5 Section 5.3...The appeal 
period in a civil case is thirty days. In a criminal 
case it is ten. Day one is the first day after entry 
of the order or judgment from which the appeal is to be 
taken, and day tKirty (in a civil appeal) is the last 
day to file ttie notice of appeal. If the last day falls 
on a weekend or legal holiday, as defined in F.R.A.P. 
Rule 26(a), the period extends to the end of the next 
regular business day. This applies even if the last 
day is a Saturday and the clerks office is open. The 
desperate can still meet the deadline after the clerks 
office has closed on the last day by personally 
delivering the notice to the clerk, together with the 
prescribed filing fee....n (Emphasis Added) 
Conclusion 
Based upon statutory provisions and case law regarding 
computation of time the appeal herein was timely. The 
defendant/respondent did not point out the existing case law and 
interpretations of statutes under computation of time and 
accordingly and therefore the Utah Court of Appeals misapprehended 
the case law herein. Plaintiff/appellant is entitled to have the 
Order of Dismissal recinded and his appeal reinstated so that the 
appeal may progress in its normal course and he requests such 
relief. 
DATED this t^ day of 
Stafaefo Lee Piston 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
ADDENDUM 
) ) 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899) 
of and for 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
525 East 100 South, Suite 500 
P. O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-1008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * 
BLAINE THOMAS HOFELING, ) 
) MOTION FOR DISMISSAL 
Plaintiff, ) OF APPEAL 
v. ) 
) C i v i l No. D 8 2 - 2 5 8 7 
LAURA CATHERINE (HOFELING) ) J u d g e J a m e s S. S a w a y a 
WITOWSKI, ) 
D e f e n d a n t s . ) 
* * * * * 
Respondent, Laura Catherine (Hofeling) Witowski, 
hereby moves the above-entitled court to dismiss the appeal of 
the plaintiff /appellant on the grounds that it is not timely 
filed, to-wit: The Order Declining Jurisdiction from which the 
appeal is taken was filed and entered on January 26, 1988 (see 
Exhibit "A" attached hereto); the Notice of Appeal in this 
matter was filed on February 26, 1988, (see Exhibit u B" 
attached hereto); that is 31 days after the entry of the Order 
H-
when, as a jurisdictional requirement, the appeal wae required, 
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4(a) of the Rules of the 
Utah Court of Appeals to be filed within thirty (30) days from 
the entry of the Order from which the appeal is taken. 
DATED this ff day of March, 1988. 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ £) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILINQ 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a 
true copy of the above and foregoing Motion for Dismissal of 
Appeal, this 
__2 d ay o f March, 1988, to: 
Mr. Steven Lee Payton 
Attorney at Law 
431 South 300 East, Suite 40 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
p M M ' P - ' O , I FILED IN CLERK'S OF 
L-L—..5rT-*2" : '"'" '"---! Salt L3ke County. U 
FICE 
tah 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ, Esq. (0899) 
of and for 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorneys for Defendant 
525 East 100 South, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
JAN 2 G 1988 
Hi DUo* Hmdl&y. Clork 3rd D,<si Court 
By N b . y v i 1 . " > ^ ^ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BLAINE THOMAS HOFELING, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LAURA CATHERINE (HOFELING) 
WITOWSKI, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DECLINING 
JURISDICTION 
Civil No. D82-2587 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
The above-entitled came before the Court on December 7, 
1987, the Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding, for consideration 
of the Motion of the Defendant to Decline Jurisdiction Over Issue 
of Custody and Visitation of Children. The Plaintiff was present 
in person, represented by counsel Steven Lee Payton. The Defendant 
was represented by counsel David S. Dclowitz. The Court heard and 
considered the arguments and representations of counsel, examined 
anJ considered the records, files and papers in this matter and 
determined to take the matter under advisement. After being 
£/ A 
) 
advised in the premises, the Court has determined that the 
defendant and minor children of the parties moved from the State 
of Utah and have resided in the State of Florida since September 1, 
1964, that the Courts of the State of Florida have determined in 
the action entitled Laura Catherine Hofeling (Witowski), Petitioner 
vs. Blaine Thomas Hofeling, Respondent, Circuit Civil No. 87-6371-
20, in the Circuit Court in and for Pinellis County, State of 
Florida, Judge John S. Andrews presiding, that it should assume 
jurisdiction over the custody and visitation issues in this matter 
pursuant to the provisions of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdic-
tion Act and, accordingly, the Florida Courts are a more conven-
ient forum and this Court should, pursuant to the provisions of 
Section 78-45(c)-7, Utah Code Annotated (1987 Rep.), decline to 
exercise jurisdiction over the questions of custody and 
jurisdiction of these children and allow that matter to proc: vd 
before the Courts of the State of Florida. 
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND Lv.CrLz.:. 
that this Court declines jurisdiction over the questions of 
custody and visitation of the minor children in the above-
referenced matter to enable the Circuit Court of Pinellis County, 
State of Florida to resolve those questions in the action entitled 
Laura Catherine Hofeling fWitowski). Petitioner vs. Dlaine Thomas 
Hof el ing. Respondent, Circuit Civil No. 87-637 1-20. 
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DATED t h i s "3/ y/fMit/^ty f 
</'*• d a y o f ^ 0 c c c m b g r / ^ 1 9 b L l , 
/ /* >J&rT'*7*k— 
/ ydAMES S. SAWAxA 
V / ' D i s t r i c t C o u r t J u d g e 
I APPROVED BY: 
;STEVEN LEE PAYTON 
\ Attorney for Plaintiff 
/' <4- S 
.>?- ^CJ '-€• <>4J^ 
I DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
iAttorney for Defendant 
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STEVEN LEE PAYTON (#2554) "' '" 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
431 South 300 East, Suite 40 iE3 Z; .' 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7070 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THTRD JUDICI^PISTRICT 
_ML1 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
r.LAINE THOMAS HOFELING, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs . 
LAURA CATHERINE (HOFELING) 
WITOWSKI, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
C i v i l No'. D 8 2 - 2 5 8 7 
( J u d g e , J a m e s S . S a v / a y a ) 
i i. 
-i 
^ 
A u t h o r i t y 
R. Utah Ct. App. Rule 3 [Appeal As Of Right; How Taken] 
R. Utah Ct. App. Rule 4 [Appeal As Of Right: When Taken] 
U.C.A. 78-2a-3(g) [Court of Appeals Jurisdiction] 
TBffective January 1, 1988] 
Appeals From District Court Involving Domestic 
Relations Cases 
•I 3^° 
s£ . i<\ 
^^ s ^ »- — 
: Su5 2 
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I Notice of Appeal Civil No. D82-2587 Page 
! Hofeling v (Hofeling) Witowski 3rd D/C SLCo. 
1. Party Appealing: Notice is hereby given that 
PLAINTIFF above-named hereby appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
2. Judgment or Order; Appeal is from the Judgment L Order 
i dated January 26, 1988, Judge, James S. Sawaya, Declining Further 
|j Jurisdiction in the within entitled case; said order having been 
j| signed January 26, 1988 and notice of same having been given to 
I; 
•• counsel by Minute Entry January 26, 1988 certifing that it was 
! mailed January 26, 1988 however postmarked January 27, 1988 to 
j: 
!j counsel herein. 
i! 
i! 3. Court Appeal From: Appeal is taken from the Third 
Ji 
H District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
j 4. Appeal To: Appeal is taken to the Utah Court of 
Appeals pursuant to its jurisdictional authority as set out 
herein. 
iff" 
DATED t h i s 2fe*~ day o f f&&f&Atf&f' , 19 <^Q 
Attorney 
^ T A T E O F U T A H - >
 M 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) ° ° 
I. T h e UUOER3iONED. CLCftK OF THE DISTRICT 
COUflT OF i A i T LAKE COUNTY. UTAH. 0 0 H E R E * / 
CERTIFY THAT THE ANNEXED AND f CaCQOIMQ 13 
A THUS Ah>0 FULL COf>r O f AN 0H:G»H>L D O C -
WENT ON FILE 1H Wf Of F.CE AS SoC*t CLERK 
J S . t i DIXON HINOLEYVCLERK 
AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING 
STATE OF UTAH * ) 
) ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Notice of Appeal was mailed via United States Mail, 
iiist* class, postage prepaid on the j5fi*«4iay 
tis&eoAt&t of 
-»
 1 9
_ J 3 2 L _ ™ ' t o t h e following: 
David S. Dolowitz, Esq. David M. Wall, Esq. 
525 East 100 South, Suite 500 The Atrium 
P.O. Box 11008 2420 Enterprise Road, £204 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0008 Clearwater, FL 34623 
Certified Mail 0P717-949-OQQ Certified Mail IP717-949-001 
Blaine T. Hofeling 
4329 Shirlev Lane 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
(U.S. Certificate of Mailing) 
Authority 
Rules of Practice in the District Court and Circuit Courts 
~^.
 tfoe state of Utah; 
Rule 2.9 "Written Orders, Judgments & Decrees"; 
U.C.A. 77-35-3 Rule 3 "Service & Filing of Papers"; 
U.R.C.P. Rule 5 "Service and Filing of Pleadings and Other 
Papers" 
R. Utah Ct. App. Rule 21 "Filing and Service" 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me thisZ6?T>^ day 
^ ^b^Q^, -^19 % • 
^ ^ U i l f CQj M /V>H k\ 
NotJ fyjjublic 
rfjSgtk RBfXCA 0. STAKTOH 
sn •= oouortf yum* i* CMHL ijftxk * * i. iwo 
'•> 
Salt Lake County 
H. DIXON HINDLEY, CLERK 
240 East 400 South 
P.O. Box i860 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 PRESORTED FIRST CLASS 
\ 
;AN276S * 
US. POSTAGE 
te?^ 
"*H0;13 
H r£, • 
Steven Lee Payton 
431 South 300 East 
Suite 40 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
MINUTE BOOK FORM 101 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
County of Salt Lake - State of Utah 
FILE NO. D82-2587 
TITLE: (• PARTIES PRESENT) COUNSEL. W COUNSEL PRESENT) 
BLAINE THOiMAS HOFELING : S t e v e n L e e P a y t o n 
- v s - : 
LAURA CATHERINE (HOFELING) : D a v i d S . D o l o w i t z 
WITOWSKI 
HON.. 
James S. Sawaya 
DATE: 
January 26, 1988 
1/25/88 HEARD: Plaintiff's objection to order submitted by defendant. 
The Court, having reviewed and examined orders submitted by 
both parties, now determine^ that the order submitted by defendant is a 
proper order reflecting the findings and Intent of the court. The order is 
signed and entered this date. Plaintiff'supposed order is filed unsigned 
ZL / 
I . A.. .«^ o/^  i aw 
%J/ F I L E D 
MAWi 1988^  Cf 
'cAs^Vk, >^ZSL 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Blaine Thomas Hofeling, 
Plaintiff and Appellant/ 
Utah Court at Appc-ui 
Laura Catherine (Hofeling) 
Witowski, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Case No. 880151-CA 
Before Judges Garff, Jackson and Orme (On Law and Motion). 
The motion of defendant-respondent Laura Catherine 
(Hofeling) Witowski to dismiss the above-entitled appeal as 
untimely, is granted^and the appeal is hereby dismissed. See R< 
Utah Ct.* App^4(au)^and Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(d) . 
DATED tMs ^/ f day of March, 1988 
FOR THE COURT: 
Regnal W. Garff, 
'\~/' 'W 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL by depositing the same in the United 
States mail postage prepaid to the following: 
Steven Lee Payton 
Attorney at Law 
431 South 300 East, Suite 40 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
David S. Dolowitz 
Attorney at Law 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal 
525 East First South, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0008 
Salt Lake County Court 
Dixon Hindley, Clerk 
Attn: LaDean Parker, Clerk 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
DATED this 1st day of April, 1988-
n C/ 
By ^ - v . / 6v/' 
Case Manager 
»i »»MM''«MMi« 
33iai] (ttouri of appeals H ^ ^ ^ f f 
400 Mid town Plaza (%
 m . m < V * X 4 § 
230 South 500 East V 1&&M 
I *Ve Pirv. I Jrah 84102 \ Ort^.A'^'^ Salt Lak  City, Ut   
Steven Lee Payton 
Attorney at Law 
431 South 300 East, Suite 40 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
rj 
I 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
CLERK'S OFFICE 
240 EAST 4TH SOUTH P.O. BOX 1860 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
CASE NUMBER DATE CHECK CASH JUDGE 
;> 3202587 02/26/88 X JAMES S. SAWAYA 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
COUNTY CLERK 
TEL.(801)533-7341 
m RECEIPT NO RECD- BY ~ 
8306388 JB ' 
RECEIVED OF'. STEVEN PAYTON*M23.00 TO UTAH COURT OF APPEALS** 
NAME ATTORNEY I.D. MD. 
:
"....AIMTIFF: HOFELING BLAINE THOMAS 0 
DEFENDANT: HOFELING LAURA CATHERINE 
CODE DESCRIPTION 
060 APPEAL TO APPELLANT COURT 
TOTAL FEES PAID 
AMOUNT 
$ 3 0 . 0 0 
•fi~0, 0 0 
i l l 
SALT LAKE COUNTY CLERK 
ROOM A-204 • COURTS BUILDING 
240 EAST FOURTH SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
FINES & FORFEITURES Jl 
"2 . 
/ 
C? Q$ 
1Q J ^ 
JJ? 20032 
RECEIVED ^ f e u ^ A • rUj^TZ^ 
/'As* e- tkk^^e^'^f/'t^--
.DOLLARS $i 
Mtii&do*^ 
v 
— - > H- ffiUA^^, fLorfcossfc- / / 
/ • i ' CJ fl /> #3c!X.-/ / 
CASE NO. 
jy?z.--ziT7 
H. DIXON HINDLEY, CLERK 
BY. 
<L
-2£ Tzr DEPUTY 
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[1] Each of these insurers should be re-
garded as standing in the shoes of its own 
insured and as having the same rights and 
liabilities as its insured has. Therefore, it is 
appropriate to determine who would bear 
the loss if no insurance existed. 
[2] Under the common law, any liability 
would be upon Mr. Johnson, the alleged 
tort-feasor, and his insurer (Horace Mann) 
would be obliged to step into his shoes and 
defend him. However, the Public Employ-
ees' Indemnification Act has altered this. 
In requiring public entities to protect their 
employees from such losses by defending 
and indemnifying them for claims arising 
from activities within the scope of their 
employment, except for acts of "gross neg-
ligence, fraud or malice,"2 the statute 
shifts liability to the school district. 
In addition to this shifting of liability 
from the teacher to the school district, the 
statute further specifically provides that if 
the public entity (the school district here) 
pays such a claim, the entity cannot seek 
reimbursement from its employee (Johnson 
here).3 Those statutory provisions which 
thus transfer responsibility for such a claim 
from the employee to the school district, 
and further provide that the district cannot 
even obtain reimbursement from the em-
ployee, manifest a clear legislative intent 
that it is the school district and not the 
employee who must bear any such a loss.4 
What protection the school teachers may or 
may not receive from defendant Horace 
Mann is not material here. But, it may be 
of interest to observe that the latter's policy 
does cover excess over that insured by 
plaintiff Gulf and perhaps other matters 
excepted by the statute. 
On the basis of what has been said above, 
it is our conclusion that the trial court 
2. Sec. 63 4g-5, U.C.A.1953. "(1) Except as 
provided in subsection (2) of this section, if a 
public entity pays all or part of any judgment 
based on or a compromise or settlement of the 
claim against itself or an officer or employee, 
the officer or employee is not liable to indemni-
fy ihe public entity for this payment. (2) If the 
public entity pays all or part of any judgment 
based on a claim against itself or an officer or 
eniplo\ee, the public entity may recover the 
amount ot such payment it it is established that 
correctly ruled that it is the school district 
and its insurer plaintiff Gulf Insurance 
Company, which are obligated to defend 
and respond on l>ehalf of the teacher, Rus-
sell Johnson. 
Affirmed. Costs to defendant (respon-
dent). 
ELLETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN, WIL-
KINS and HALL, JJ., concur. 
Aria Jean GLAD, now Aria Jean Segmil-
ler, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Harvey Lowell GLAD, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 14894. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 8, 1977. 
Order to show cause was obtained by 
divorced wife to enforce support provisions 
of second divorce decree. The ex-husband 
moved to dismiss the order for lack of juris-
diction and wife moved to dismiss first di-
vorce case and vacate its decree on ground 
of reconciliation. The Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, Stewart M. Hanson, Sr., 
J., granted husband's motion to dismiss, de-
termining decree in initial case had become 
final, and wife appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Hall, J., held that: (1) husband's 
the officer or employee acted or failed to act 
due to gross negligence, fraud, or malice." 
3. Ibid. See subsection (I) above. 
4. St Paul Ins Co. v. Horace Mann Ins. Co, 2J1 
N.W.2d 619 (Iowa 1975); Bridewell v. Board of 
Education, 2 M.App.3d 684. 276 N.L.2d 745 
(1971). 
GLAD i 
Cite as S€ 
timely motions objecting to findings and 
conclusions suspended all proceedings as to 
first decree until court disposed of it and, 
since motion was merely stricken from cal-
endar and not heard on its merits, there 
was not a final disposition and consequently 
the first divorce did not become absolute; 
and (2) second decree which parties abided 
by without any attack was valid and abso-
lute and supported wife's order to show 
cause. 
Judgment of dismissal of order to show 
cause reversed, case remanded for hearing 
thereon. 
Crockett, J., concurred in result, but 
dissented in part and filed opinion. 
1. Divorce o=> 150.2 
Ex-husband's timely motions objecting 
to findings and conclusions susj>ended all 
proceedings in divorce case until court dis-
posed of it and, since motion was merely 
stricken from calendar and not heard on its 
merits, there was not a final disposition and 
consequently the divorce did not become 
absolute. 
2. Divorce <s=>243 
Where divorce decree was two years 
old and parties abided by it without any 
attack thereon, the decree was valid and 
absolute and supported order to show cause 
to enforce its support provisions. 
3. Time <a=>9(8), 10(9) 
Although order api>ealed from was en-
tered on October 28, 1976 and notice of 
appeal was filed on November 29, appeal 
was not untimely, in view of rule excluding 
day of act from any designated time period 
and excluding last day of period if it falls 
on Sunday. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 
6(a). 
Leland S. McCullough, McCullough & 
McCullough, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff 
and appellant. 
Quentin L. R. Alston, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and respondent. 
i. GLAD Utah 1 6 1 
7 P.2d 160 
HALL, Justice: 
Appeal from an order of dismissal of an 
order to show cause filed in the District 
Court of Salt Lake County. 
The Glads were parties to a contested 
divorce action wherein findings of fact, con-
clusions of law and decree of divorce were 
entered on April 23, 1973. Three days later 
defendant filed a document entitled "No-
tice" which was duly served upon plaintiff 
advising of a hearing date of May 14, 1973, 
on defendant's objection to the said find-
ings, conclusions and decree claimed therein 
to be contrary to the court's order and 
minute entry. On the date scheduled for 
the hearing of said objections neither party 
appeared and on the court's own motion the 
objections were stricken from the calendar. 
Defendant does not challenge the validity 
of the pleading entitled "Notice" as being 
also an objection, and in fact refers to it as 
such. 
Some three months later the parties lived 
together for a time without re-marrying 
and after a further time Mrs. Glad again 
filed an action for divorce, making no refer-
ence to the prior decree, and obtained a 
second decree by default. Over two years 
later Mrs. Glad sought and obtained the 
order to show cause in question attempting 
to enforce the support provisions of the 
second degree. It was heard by the same 
trial judge that granted the second decree 
and when the facts concerning the first 
decree surfaced Mr. Glad moved to dismiss 
the order to show cause for lack of jurisdic-
tion and Mrs. Glad moved to dismiss the 
first case and vacate its decree on the 
grounds of reconciliation. The court grant-
ed Mr. Glad's motion to dismiss determining 
the decree in the initial case had become 
final. On appeal Mrs. Glad assigns as error 
(1) the court's refusal to dismiss the first 
case and thus rentier the decree in the 
second case a valid, final decree, and (2) 
failing to support its ruling with findings of 
fact and conclusions of law. 
The rules provide for amendment of a 
judgment on motion of a party made not 
162 Utah 567 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
later than 10 days after entry of judgment,1 
and the divorce statutes provide that a de-
cree shall not become absolute until the 
expiration of three months from the date of 
entry and not then if an appeal or other 
proceedings for review are pending.2 
The foregoing have been previously inter-
preted by this court. In Spencer v. Clark3 
the defendant in a divorce proceeding filed 
a motion to set aside the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law for the reason that 
they did not conform to the testimony ad-
duced at trial. The court determined that 
the motion prevented the divorce from be-
coming absolute until the statutory period 
(then six months) had elapsed after the 
motion was disposed of. 
A similar result was reached in Boucofski 
v. Jacobsen4 wherein the power of a court 
to modify its findings was recognized and 
further noted that the time for appeal be-
gins to run from the date the additional 
findings or conclusions are made and en-
tered, not from the date of the original 
judgment. 
[1] We again hold that a timely motion 
setting forth objections suspends all pro-
ceedings until the court disposes of the 
same and that since the motion was merely 
stricken from the calendar and not heard on 
its merits, such was not a final disposition 
and consequently the first divorce did not, 
and has not as yet, become absolute. Hav-
ing so ruled, it is not necessary to treat the 
further assignments of error, nor is it nec-
essary to reverse the trial court's refusal to 
dismiss the first case. 
[2] The second decree, being some two 
years old, and the parties having abided by 
it without any attack thereon, jurisdictional 
or otherwise, we hold to be valid and abso-
lute and properly supportive of the order to 
show cause dismissed below. 
1. Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. Section 30 3 ?. U.C.A.I953. 
3. 54 Utah 83, 179 P. 741 (1919) 
4. 36 I t a h 165, 104 P. 117 (1909). 
[3] Defendant asserts that the appeal 
should be dismissed as not being timely and 
in support thereof points out the order ap 
pealed from was entered on October 28, 
19*^ 6, and that the notice of appeal was filed 
on November 29, 1976, more than one 
month after the entry of said order.* Rule 
6(a), U.R.C.P. is dispositive of this point in 
providing for the computation of time that 
the day of the act, event, or default after 
which the designated period of time begins 
to run is not included. Also, if the last day 
of the period falls on Sunday it is not" 
included and such was the case here. Con-
sequently, the appeal was timely filed. 
The judgment of dismissal of the order to 
show cause is reversed and the case is re-
manded for hearing thereon. No costs 
awarded. 
ELLETT, C. J , and MAUGHAN and 
WILKINS, JJ. 
CROCKETT, Justice: (concurring in re-
sult, but dissenting in part). 
I concur in the holding that the Order To 
Show Cause was issued on a valid judgment 
(the so-called Second Decree) and that it 
should not have been dismissed. But, I 
have some observations which I regard as 
of sufficient importance to record. 
I do not see the necessity for the dictum 
that the filing of the "notice" or "objection" 
to the findings in the first divorce case, and 
leaving it undisposed of, would necessarily 
have the effect of preventing a divorce 
from becoming final. Nor do I believe that 
such a ruling is in conformity with sound 
policy or with our Rules of Procedure. 
Whatever effect it may have had here, 
there was something relating to the marital 
status between these parties that could be 
and was adjudicated by the Second Decree 
That was done; and for the reasons stated 
above and in the main opinion, that judg-
ment stands as valid and unassailed. 
5. Rule 73(a), U.R.C.P. provides the time within 
which an appeal may be taken shall be one 
month from entry of judgment on order appeal-
ed from. 
G1LLHAM ADVERTISING 
Cite as 567 i 
My apprehension is about any notion that 
the mere filing of such a "notice," or a 
motion, and leaving it undisposed of, 
whether designedly or inadvertently, would 
prevent otherwise valid proceedings and de-
crees thereon from ever becoming final. 
The multifarious mischiefs that might re-
sult in many of the thousands of divorce 
decrees upon which people rely and go their 
way, having children and accumulating 
property, etc., are so obvious that I spare 
extenuation thereon here. 
It is my opinion that the language of Sec. 
30-3-7, U.C.A.1953, that "the Decree of 
Divorce shall become absolute at the expi-
ration of three months from the entry 
thereof; unless an appeal or other proceed-
ings for review are pending 
should be understood as meaning "an ap-
peal or other proceedings" in the nature of, 
or equivalent to, an appeal; and further, 
that an undisposed of motion does not reach 
that dignity. 
Supporting the conclusion I advocate is 
the fact that the effect of the filing of such 
a motion (and other motions of similar char-
acter) is stated in Rule 73(a), U.R.C.P. that: 
The running of the time for 
appeal is terminated by a timely motion 
made pursuant to any of the rules herein-
after enumerated 
Granting or denying a motion for judg-
ment under Rule 50(b), 
Denying a motion under Rule 52(b) to 
amend or make additional Findings of 
Fact, . . . 
Motion under Rule 59 to alter or amend 
judgment; or denying a motion for a new 
trial. [All emphasis herein added.] 
But our rules do not provide for any other 
effect of the filing of such motions. 
For the reasons above stated, I do not 
agree with and therefore exclude from my 
concurrence the statement that "a timely 
motion setting forth objections suspends all 
proceedings until the court disposes of the 
same." I think the rule should be that it 
does only what the statute and the rules 
above referred to say; that it extends the 
time for appeal. I appreciate that there is 
a basis for difference of view on this mat-
AGCY., INC. v. IPSON Utah 1 6 3 
P.2d 1*3 
ter; and I therefore offer the suggestion 
that the rules should be amended to provide 
that if any such motion is not disposed of 
within a reasonable time, say 60 or 90 days 
after it is filed, it shall be deemed to be 
denied. 
GILLHAM ADVERTISING AGENCY, 
INC., a corporation, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Robert K. IPSON, dba Bonneville Race-
ways, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 14843. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 12s 1977. 
In action by advertising agency against 
racetrack operator for advertising debt, the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Marcellus K. Snow, J., granted summary 
judgment in favor of agency and operator 
appealed. The Supreme Court,.Ellett, C. J., 
held that oj>erator, by signing as president 
of corporation a written agreement cover-
ing fees and setting time and conditions of 
payment prepared after he had failed to 
pay advertising debt, made himself liable, 
even if it had been an original obligation, 
where there was no such corporation of 
which he was president. 
Affirmed. 
Maughan, J., dissented and filed opin-
ion in which Wilkins, J., concurred. 
1. Corporations <s=>653 
Where racetrack operator personally 
leased racetrack and personally conducted 
racing activity, advertising debt was |>er-
sonaily his and not that of his Nevada cor-
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striking "a balance between the interests of 
the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting 
upon matters of public concern and the 
interest of the State, as an employer, in 
promoting the efficiency of the public ser-
vice it performs through its employees."18 
In the present case the interest of the State 
corresponds to the education of its pupils 
which is the primary objective of the school 
district. 
Rather than contradicting this interest 
•the free expression of educational ap-
proaches and responsible criticism of school 
programs by employees of the school dis-
trict facilitates the effective performance 
of public education. As long as the employ-
ee does not violate established policies of 
the school district responsible statements 
concerning those policies should not be cur-
tailed and represent constitutionally pro-
tected speech.19 
Therefore, El well's statements and posi-
tions concerning the middle school concept 
cannot be relied upon by the Board to sup-
port his termination.20 However, this was 
specifically listed in Goodworth's letter of 
March 7, 1977, under charge number 2, as 
one example of Elweli's wilful failure and 
refusal to follow the policies of the Board. 
Similarly charge number 4, that El well ad-
mitted that he had not supjx>rted Board 
policies cannot be relied upon as cause for 
termination. 
18. See Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. 
Doyle. 429 U.S. 274, 284, 97 S.Ct. 568, 574, 50 
L.Ed.2d 471 (1977), (quoting from Pickering v. 
Board of Education, 39 J U.S. 563. 568. 88 S.Ct. 
1731, 1734. 20 LEd.2d 811 (1968)). 
19. See Mt Healthy City Board of Education v. 
Doyle, supra note 18, 429 U.S at 284. 97 S.Ct. 
at 574; Bernasconi v. Tampa Elementary 
School District No. 3, 548 F 2d 857 (9th Cir. 
1977). 
20. See Board of Trustees, Laramie County 
School District No. 1 v. Spiegel, Wyo, 549 P.2d 
1161, 1174 (1976) ("Cause may not be found in 
a constitutionally-protected reason") 
21. While co-worker harmony is a factor to con-
sider in determining the breadth of constitu-
tional protections to expression in this area, 
that factor must be viewed in relation to the 
content of the employee's statements and the 
^ ^ » particular relationship in question See Picker-
• ^ ing v Bi>ard >>f Education, supra note 18. 391 
^\ 
Likewise, the fact the remedial meetings 
between Mr. Elwell and Superintendent 
Goodworth were made public does not in-
terfere materially with the efficiency of the 
public services performed by the school sys-
tem. The interests of Mr. Elwell and the 
public's right to be informed, outweigh the 
relatively insignificant effect this disclosure 
would have on the already inconsonant rela-
tionship between the principal and the su-
perintendent.21 Therefore, notwithstanding 
the factual questions surrounding the dis-
closure of this information, Elweli's alleged 
disclosure of the fact that remedial meet-
ings were in progress falls within the con-
stitutional protections of free speech and 
cannot be relied upon as a basis for termi-
nation.22 
Because constitutionally protected activi-
ties cannot constitute cause for termination, 
the ultimate findings of insubordination 
must be supported by the remaining 
charges presented by the March 7th and 
June 4th letters and evidence in support 
thereof. In the present case, the letter of 
June 4th indicates that the cause for El-
weli's termination was insubordination. 
Thus, before we can decide whether the 
basic facts are supported by substantive 
evidence and whether those basic facts rea-
sonably support the inferred ultimate fact 
of insubordination that term must be 
defined. 
U.S. at 570, 88 S.Ct. at 1735. The mere act of 
expression cannot be repressed by the dictates 
of the employee's supervisor. As stated by the 
Wyoming Supreme Court in Board of Trustees, 
Laramie County School District No I v. Spie-
gel, supra note 20. 549 P.2d at 1176; ". 
public school teachers may not be constitution 
ally compelled, as a condition of retaining their 
employment, to relinquish the First Amend 
ment rights that they would otherwise enjoy as 
citizens to comment on matters of public inter 
est in connection, with the operation of the 
public schools in which they work . . . " 
22. Although the notice may have been released 
in contradiction to Superintendent Good-
worth's request, he has no more authority than 
the school system itself to restrict Elweli's con-
stitutionally protected rie.ht of free expression, 
and his request to curtail that repression must 
be seen as unreasonable and unauthorised. 
GILROY 
Cite as, Utah, 
Insubordination as grounds for the termi-
nation of an employment contract of a ten-
ured educator has been defined as: " . . . 
'constant or continuing intentional refusal 
to obey a direct or implied order, reasonable 
in nature, and given by and with proper 
authority. '" n 
While certain jurisdictions have held that 
insubordination includes a wilful refusal of 
a teacher to obey reasonable rules and regu-
lations the better reasoned decisions place 
emphasis on the presence of a persistent 
course of wilful defiance.24 Therefore, in 
the latter jurisdictions to constitute cause 
for termination, it must be established that 
the teacher embarked upon a persistent 
course of wilful defiance.25 
Applying this definition, the basic facts 
found by the Board would have to establish 
a persistent course of wilful defiance by 
Elwell before they could reasonably support 
the ultimate fact of insubordination. The 
evidence presented at the hearing in ques-
tion does not substantially support the basic 
facts required to establish a persistent 
course of defiance. Therefore, no substan-
tive evidence has been presented which can 
reasonably support the ultimate finding of 
insubordination.24 While the evidence re-
lates a variety of intermittent trivial acts in 
variance with requests of the superintend-
ent it does not detail any persistent defi-
ance by Elwell. The intermittent infrac-
tions presented at the hearing are simply 
too insignificant to justify the ultimate 
sanction of non-renewal. 
Also, the alleged findings of basic fact 
outlined in the June 4th letter do not rea-
sonably support an inference of insubordi-
23. Ray v. Minneapolis Board of Education, Spe-
cial School District No. i, 295 Minn. 13, 202 
N.W 2d 375, 378 (1972); (quoting from Shock-
ley v. Board of Education, 51 Del. 537. 149 A.2d 
331, 334, reversed on other grounds, 52 Del. 
237. 155 A 2d 323 (1959)). Thus. Elweli's al-
leged refusal to comply with Goodworth's re-
quest not to disclose the reconstruction work 
cannot support a finding of insubordination be-
cause the request was neither reasonable in 
nature nor issued with proper authority 
24. Board of Trustees of Weston County School 
District No. 1 v. Holso. Wyo.. 584 P 2d 1009 
(1978). 
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nation. Because that inference does not 
follow reasonably from the alleged basic 
facts presented after the hearing in the 
June 4 letter, the Board's decision is arbi-
trary and capricious.27 
Therefore, appropriate substantive re-
view of the evidence in support of the 
charges found in the June 4th letter would 
require the decision of the Park City School 
Board be overturned and the plaintiff rein-
stated to his previous position of employ-
ment. The majority's failure to undertake 
any substantive review of this decision, 
while accepting the letter of June 4th as the 
Board's findings of fact, results in what I 
believe is a critical emasculation of the 
Utah Orderly Termination Procedures Act 
and the perpetration of an injustice. 
Frank K. GILROY, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Peter M. LOWE and Martha Lowe, his 
wife, et al., Defendants and 
Appellants, 
Wendell L. Butcher et al., Defendants 
and Respondents. 
No. 16764. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 19, 1981. 
Cross defendants appealed from the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Ho-
25. Id. at 1016. 
26. See Gwathmey v. P. T Atkinson, 447 
F.Supp. 1113 (E D.Vir.1976) See also Johnson 
v. Branch. 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966); John-
son v. Butler, 433 F.Supp. 531 (W.D.Vir.1977); 
Board of Trustees, etc. v. Holso, supra note 24, 
584 P.2d at 1016. 
27. Bogart v. Unified School District, No. 298 of 
Lincoln County, 432 F.Supp. rfi»5 (D.Kan 197 7). 
Kruse v. Board of Directors of Lamom Commu-
nity School District. Iowa. 2M N.W.2d t>26 
(1975). 
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nier F. Wilkinson, J., challenging an execu-
tion sale based on judgment rendered in 
favor of cross plaintiffs and against cross 
defendants. The Supreme court, Howe, J., 
held that: (1) sheriff was not prohibited 
from carrying out execution sale because 
cross defendants had filed and served a 
declaration of homestead prior to the sale, 
and (2) where judgment debtors had not 
paid any portion of sizable judgment 
against them and had not been subjected to 
collection of it by the original judgment 
creditor, any amounts recovered by the as-
signee apparently inured to the benefit of 
assignors, and there was no claim of preju-
dice to cross defendants resulting from par-
tial assignment or from execution sale 
based on the assignment, partial assign-
ment of judgment creditors' judgment to 
assignee and execution sale held thereunder 
were valid. 
Affirmed. 
1. Time e=>9<5), 10(6) 
Execution sale on October 22, 1979, 
which related to judgment rendered on Oc-
tober 22, 1971, was timely pursuant to rule 
providing that a writ of execution may 
issue at any time within eight years after 
entry of judgment, in that day from which 
time period is to run is excluded and the 
same calendar date of the final month or 
year is included when time period is meas-
ured in months or years from certain date, 
and furthermore, even if limitations period 
expired on October 21, 1979, that date was a 
Sunday, and time period extended until the 
end of the next day. Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. Rules 6(a), 69(a); U.C.A.1953, 68-3-8. 
2. Homestead o=>66 
Sheriff was not prohibited from carry-
ing out execution sale of cross defendants' 
home on ground that cross defendants had 
filed and served a declaration of homestead 
prior to its sale, in that cross defendants' 
interest in home, $34,000, exceeded in value 
the amount of the homestead exemption, 
$8,000, and the assignee, which bid in $100,-
000 of the judgment against cross defend-
$•"•• ants, {.'aid to sheriff on behalf of cross d« -
ID 
fendants $8,000, the amount representing 
homestead exemption. Const. Art. 22, § 1; 
U.C.A.1953. 28^-1-1 et seq., 28-1-15. 
3. Judgment <*=>920 
Assignee of a portion of judgment 
against cross defendants was entitled to 
have execution issued, even though cross 
defendants asserted that purported assign-
ee of judgment creditors' judgment was 
not, in fact, an assignee of judgment credi-
tors' judgment, in that record provided am-
ple support for finding that an assignment 
was made from judgment creditors to the 
assignee. 
4. Judgment c=»836 
A judgment may be assigned to some-
one who is not a party to the initial action, 
and assignee receives the right to enforce 
such a judgment. 
5. Judgment <*=>838 
Where judgment debtors had not paid 
any portion of sizable judgment against 
them and had not been subjected to collec-
tion of it by the original judgment credi-
tors, any amounts recovered by assignee 
apparently inured to the benefit of the as-
signor, and there was no claim of prejudice 
to cross plaintiffs resulting from partial 
assignment or from execution sale based on 
the assignment, partial assignment of judg-
ment creditors' judgment to assignee and 
execution sale held thereunder were valid. 
Richard J. Leedy, Salt Lake City, for 
defendants and appellants. 
Earl D. Tanner & Associates, J. Thomas 
Bowen, Salt Lake City, for defendants and 
respondents. 
HOWE, Justice: 
This appeal challenges an execution sale 
based on a judgment rendered in favor of 
cross-plaintiffs Wendell L. and Irene B. 
Butcher and against cross-defendants and 
appellants Peter M. Lowe and Martha 
Lowe, his wife, in the amount of $309,-
479.90. Appellants contend that the execu-
tion sale should have been set aside because 
(1) the limitations period had expires! at the 
GILROY v. LOWE 
Ctteas,UUh.re«P.2<i4«» 
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time of the sale; (2) the filing and service 
of a declaration of homestead exempted 
api>ellants' home from a sheriff's sale to 
satisfy the judgment; and (3) the execution 
sale was void because it was instituted at 
the behest of an assignee of only a portion 
of the judgment.1 
[1] Rule 69(a), Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, provides that a writ of execution 
may issue at any time within eight years 
after the entry of judgment. In this case 
the judgment was rendered on October 22, 
1971, and the execution sale took place on 
Monday, October 22, 1979. Appellants 
characterize the time period between the 
two events as eight years and one day. 
They contend that the judgment lien was 
extinguished on October 21, and that the 
execution sale on the following day was, 
therefore, invalid. We disagree. The 
method of computing time periods relating 
to acts provided for by law is set out "m 
Rule 6(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and. §§~68 3-7 and 8, U.C.A. 1953, as 
amended. When the time period is meas-
ured in months or years from a certain 
date, the day from which the time period is 
to run is excluded and the same calendar 
date of the final month or year is included. 
See Albrecht v. Uranium Services, Inc., 
Utah, 596 P.2d 1025 (1979). Furthermore, 
even if the limitations period expired on 
October 21, 1979, that date was a Sunday, 
and the time period extended until the end 
of the next day. See Nelson v. Jorgenson, 
66 Utah 360, 242 P. 945 (1926). The execu-
tion sale on October 22, 1979, was timely, as 
was properly found by the trial court. 
1. Although appellants raise additional issues in 
their reply brief, these issues were not present-
ed to the District Court and will not be con-
sidered for the first time on appeal. 
2. Article XXII. § I states. The Legislature shall 
provide by law, for the selection by each head 
of a family, an exemption of a homestead, 
which may consist of one or more parcels of 
land, together with the appurtenances and im-
provements thereon of the value of at ieast 
fifteen hundred dollars, from sale on execution 
3. § 28 I 1 provides: A homestead consisting 
of lands, appurtenances and improvements, 
which lands may be in one or more localities, 
The second issue raised by appellants is 
that the sheriff was prohibited from carry-
ing out the execution sale because appel-
lants had filed and served a declaration of 
homestead prior to the sale. A homestead 
right is mandated by Article XXII, § 1, 
Utah Constitution,2 and further provided 
for by §§ 28-1-1 et seq., U.C.A.3 As appel-
lants view the homestead exemption in 
light of its underlying policy, it is a com-
plete bar to execution on a person's home 
regardless of its value or the amount of 
equity the judgment debtor owns in the 
home. This interpretation, however, would 
render meaningless the monetary limita-
tions established by the Legislature to 
define the homestead exemption. 
[2] The appellants in the present case 
are entitled by statute to a homestead ex-
emption in the amount of $8,000, based on 
the legislative provision for $6,000 for the 
head of the family and $2,000 for the 
spouse. In their declaration of homestead 
appellants stated the value of their home to 
be $45,000, less the unpaid first trust deed 
of approximately $11,000, for a net vaiue of 
$34,000. The appellants' interest in the 
home, therefore, exceeded in value the 
amount of the homestead exemption. A 
sale is not prohibited in these circumstanc-
es, but only when "the bid does not exceed 
the value of the exemption, when the home-
stead is in one piece." § 28-1-15, U.C.A.4 
The principle that a homestead property 
may be sold when its cash value exceeds the 
exemption has previously been recognized 
by this Court. In Payson Exchange Sav-
ings Bank v. Tietjen, 63 Utah 321, 225 P. 
not exceeding in value with the appurtenances 
and improvements thereon the sum of $6,000 
for the head of the family, and the further sum 
of $2,000 for the spouse . . . shall be exempt 
from judgment lien and from execution or 
forced sale. 
4. The inflationary increase in housing values in 
recent years obviously dilutes the real protec-
tion afforded a homeowner by the statutorily-
set dollar value of the homestead exemption. 
It is for the Legislature, however, and not tor 
this Court to determine the need for policy 
implementation through changes in the law 
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598 (1924), this Court stated that when a 
claim of homestead is made a judgment 
creditor is entitled to any excess above the 
value constituting the homestead right. 
See also Ostler Land & Livestock Co. v. 
Brough, 111 Utah 336, 178 P.2d 911 (1947); 
Giesy-Walker v. Briggs, 49 Utah 205, 162 P. 
876 (1916). Cases cited by appellants deal 
primarily with situations in which the 
amount of the homestead exemption ex-
ceeded the value of the property and the 
levy of execution of a homestead was found 
to be void. See, e. g., Panagopulos v. Man-
ning, 93 Utah 198, 69 P.2d 614 (1937). Such 
cases are not controlling here. 
The homestead exemption is not a bar to 
execution in the present case. Assignee 
Federal Leasing, Inc., bid in $100,000 of the 
judgment against appellants and paid to the 
sheriff on behalf of appellants $8,000, the 
amount representing appellants' homestead 
exemption. The trial court ruled correctly 
that appellants were not entitled to claim 
the protection of the homestead exemption 
to set aside the execution sale. 
[3J Appellants' final point is that Feder-
al Leasing, Inc.,5 which was the assignee of 
a [>ortion of the judgment against appel-
lants, was not entitled to have execution 
issued in this action. This issue was 
presented to the trial court in appellants' 
motion to set aside the execution sale, dated 
October 30, 1979, as follows: 
This motion is made on the [ground] that 
. . . Federal Leasing, Inc., the purported 
assignee of Butcher's judgment is not, in 
fact, an assignee of Butcher's judgment 
The record, however, contains a document 
entitled "Partial Assignment of Judgment," 
dated August 31, 1979, and signed by Wen-
dell L. Butcher, assigning to Federal Leas-
ing $100,000 of the judgment against appel-
lants and "all sums of money up to $100,000 
5. FeieraJ Leasing. Inc.. is identified in respon-
dents* brief as a corporation created as a result 
of the divorce of Wendell and Irene B. Butcher. 
It holds property in trust for their benefit. 
6. The record does not disclose whether in the 
trial court the defendant raised the specific 
• a issue ol the validity of an assignment of only a 
c-. 
that may be obtained by means thereof, or 
in or as a result of any proceedings had 
thereon." Federal Leasing was also given 
power of attorney "to use all lawful means 
for the recovery of the aforesaid money due 
. . . " A copy of the assignment was 
presented to the sheriff at the time of the 
execution sale, as stated in the affidavit of 
J. Thomas Bowen, attorney for Federal 
Leasing and Wendell L. Butcher, dated Oc-
tober 31, 1979. A copy of the affidavit was 
mailed to counsel for appellants on October 
31, 1979, several days prior to the hearing 
on appellants' motion on November 9. The 
record provides ample support for the find-
ing that an assignment was made from 
judgment creditor Butcher to Federal Leas-
ing. 
[4] Appellants challenge the propriety 
of execution issuing at the direction of a 
"stranger or interloper to an action," but 
they cite no authority on this point. It is 
beyond question that ordinarily property or 
contract rights may be transferred to an 
assignee. A judgment may be assigned to 
someone who was not a party to the initial 
action, and the assignee receives the right 
to enforce such a judgment. See 46 Arn. 
Jur.2d Judgments § 883 (1969); 49 C.J.S. 
Judgments § 522b (1947). 
Appellants further challenge the partial 
assignment* as being invalid for being con-
trary to the "general rule" stated in 49 
C.J.S. Judgments § 520 (1947) as follows: 
As a general rule a partial assignment of 
a judgment, while valid as between the 
parties, is of no effect against the judg-
ment debtor unless he consents thereto or 
ratifies it. 
This statement is grounded on several legit-
imate policy considerations. A debtor 
should not be subject to the annoyance or 
harassment of collection efforts by diverse 
and numerous creditors holding assign-
ments of fractions of a single judgment. 
portion of a judgment. Although we recognize 
the soundness of the rule that issues may not 
be raised for the first time on appeal, the as-
signment in this case was challenged by appel-
lants in the court below, and we therefore ad-
dress the partial assignment question 
MARTIN v. 
Cbe as, Utah, i 
Nor should a judgment debtor be subject to 
further liability to an assignee when he has 
without notice of the partial assignment 
satisfied his obligation to the judgment 
creditor either by full payment or by pay-
ment of a lesser stipulated amount. A "se-
cret" partial assignment may be unenforce-
able also in situations where it would ad-
versely affect a third-party purchaser of 
property on which a judgment lien existed. 
[5] This Court has not ruled on the va-
lidity of a partial assignment of a judgment 
and whether an assignee of a portion can 
properly direct the sheriff to execute on the 
debtor's property. An early Indiana case 
upheld an oral partial assignment and an 
execution issued thereon, Wood v. Wallace, 
24 Ind. 226 (1865), and in Madison & Pen-
nings, Inc. v. Foundation Engineering Co., 
Tex.Civ.App., 390 S.W.2d 48 (1965), the 
court recognized that it was permissible to 
transfer only an interest in a judgment, 
citing Great American Indemnity v. McMcn-
amin, Tex.Civ.App., 134 S.W.2d 734 (1939). 
In the instant ca.se, the judgment debtor 
had not paid any portion of the sizeable 
judgment against him and had not h*?en 
subjected to collection efforts by the origi-
nal judgment creditor. Any amounts re-
covered by the assignee, Federal Leasing, 
apparently inured to the benefit of the as-
signor. There is no claim of prejudice to 
appellants resulting from the partial assign-
ment or from the execution sale based on 
the assignment. 
None of the reasons usually advanced for 
not recognizing partial assignments are 
here present, and we hold that under the 
facts of this case, the partial assignment 
and execution sale held thereunder are val-
id. 
Affirmed. Costs to Respondents. 
MAUGHAN, C. J., and HALL, STEW-
ART and CROCKETT,* J J., concur. 
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Forace MARTIN and Eldean Martin, 
husband and wife. Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
v. 
Herta K. DENNETT, Herta K. Dennett 
as personal representative of John El-
%ood Dennett, Deceased; EHas J. Rob-
inson; Eliza S. Robinson; Western Sav-
ings SL Loan Company, as Trustee and 
as beneficiary; Interstate Brick Compa-
ny; Bank of Salt Lake; Beneficial Life 
Insurance Company, The United States 
of America; The Industrial Commission 
of Utah; The Tax Commission of Utah; 
Southeast Ready Mix and John Runyon, 
dba Colorado Development Company, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 16781. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 19, 1981. 
Personal representative of decedent's 
estate appealed from an order of the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Christine 
M. Durham, J., which gave priority to fed-
eral tax liens recorded prior to decedent's 
death over claim made for reasonable fu-
neral expenses and expenses of administra-
tion of decedent's estate. The Supreme 
Court, Stewart, J., held that the claims for 
reasonable funeral expenses and expenses 
of administration had priority over the fed-
eral tax lien, in that the federal statute 
which establishes the priority of tax claims 
refers to estates of deceased debtors which 
cannot cover all the "debt due from the 
deceased," and statute thus accords priority 
only to debts "due from the deceased" and 
does not include debts incurred by the es-
tate, and the state statute which grants 
priority to funeral and administration ex-
penses of an estate over debts of the de-
ceased was controlling as to claims against 
the estate. 
Reversed and remanded. 
•CHOCKLTt . J., a<t<*d on this case prior to his 
retn c-mt'iii 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SER.VICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Plaintiff/Appellant Petition For Re-Hearing On 
Defendant/Respondents "Motion For Dismissal of Appeal11 [Untimely 
Appeal] was mailed via United States Mail, first class, postage 
prepaid on the |j3^ay of AffclL 
to the following: 
.. 1 9 ^ 
Blaine Thomas Hofeling Utah Court of Appeals 
4329 Shirley Lane 400 Midtown Plaza 
Salt Lake City, ITT 84117 230 South 500 East 
(U.S. Certificate of Mailing) Salt Lake City, ITT 84102 
[2. Copies! HAND DELIVERED 
David S. Dolowitz, Esq. David M. Wall, Esq. 
525 East 100 South, Suite 500 The Atrium 
P.O. Box 11008 2420 Enterprise Road #204 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0008 Clearwater, FL 34623 
Certified Mail //P717-949-134 Certified Mail,//P717-949-135 
[5 Copies] [2 Copies] 
Authority 
Rules of Practice in the District Court and Circuit Courts 
of the State of Utah; 
Rule 2.9 "Written Orders, Judgments & Decrees"; 
U.C.A. 77-35-3 Rule 3 "Service & Filing of Papers"; 
U.R.C.P. Rule 5 "Service and Filing of Pleadings and Other 
Papers" 
of 
R. Utah Ct. App. Rule 21 "Filing and Service" 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this \"#^ day 
Qvp/v iJWl! , 19 ^ 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SUPPLEMENTAL SERVICE 
) STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Plaintiff/Appellant Petition For Re-Hearing On 
Defendant/Respondents "Motion For Dismissal of Appeal11 [Untimely 
Appeal] was mailed via United States Mail, first class, postage 
%\> ^ctay of prepaid on the_ 
to the following: 
Thomas D. Koch, Esq. Mark 0. VanWagoner, Esq. 
2246 Evans Road 215 South State, Suite 500 
Clearwater, FL 34623 Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Certified Mail #P717-949-136 Certified Mail /P717-949-137 
[2 Copies] [2 Copies] 
M. Blaine Hofeling 
2317 Wilson Avenue 
Salt Lake City, UT 84108 
(U.S. Certificate of Mailing) 
[2 Copies] 
Authority 
Rules of Practice in the District Court and Circuit Courts 
of the State of Utah; 
Rule 2.9 "Written Orders, Judgments & Decrees"; 
U.C.A. 77-35-3 Rule 3 "Service & Filing of Papers"; 
U.R.C.P. Rule 5 "Service and Filing of Pleadings and Other 
Papers"" ~~ 
R. Utah Ct. App. Rule 21 "Filing and Service" 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this VJfr day 
Qj
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 1 9 jH i, of 
REBECCA D. STANTON 
mtmrmx-miiwmm 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
My Coma. Expires July 7 , 1 9 9 0 
•—Kdffu^JWC^n^ «<«><»«» 
